Concurrent Parshios

Parashas Mishpatim

Zoveach laelohim yacharam bilti lעHashem l'vado ... one who offers to other gods shall be destroyed, one may only [offer] to G-d alone (Shemos 22:19)

There are many methods of categorizing the mitzvot of the Torah: e.g., mitzvos aseh and lo sa’aseh [mitzvos requiring an action or refraining from an action] or bein adam laMakom and bein adam l’chaveiro [between man and G-d and between man and man]. Mitzvos can also be categorized by type. Rav Hirsch refers to three divisions: eidos - ritual mitzvos like taking the lulav and esrog on Sukkos or eating matzah on Pesach - chukim - mitzvos that are ordained by G-d and whose reason is untenable - e.g., parah adumah [the red heifer] or sha’atnez [the prohibition of mixing linen and wool] - and mishpatim - mitzvos necessary for society to function smoothly [e.g., the prohibition of stealing, murder, incest or returning lost objects]. Often, we find entire parshios of the Torah dealing with one area of mitzvos; e.g., our parashah, parashas Kedoshim in Sefer Vayikra, and parashas Shoftim and Ki Tetzeh in Sefer Devarim deal primarily with the area of mitzvos that enable society to govern itself. While there are other subjects that are also presented, there is usually some kind of clear delineation between the areas.

For example, in this week’s parashah, the Torah deals with the laws governing servants, maidservants, murder, accidental death, kidnapping, inflicting injury directly or through one’s property, theft, witchcraft, bestiality, the mitzvah quoted at the beginning of this essay, the proper treatment of converts, collections of loans et al. The Talmud, in a different context, questions whether the juxtaposition of seemingly unrelated laws has any halachic significance and offers a difference of opinion as to whether concurrence of subjects is only significant in Sefer Devarim or has meaning everywhere in the Torah. However, even the opinion that semuchim - juxtaposition of subjects - is only significant in Devarim would agree that this limitation is only in terms of deriving halachot from one area to another by use of hekesh. All would agree that the Torah must have had some reason for the connection between concurrent teachings organized in a single chapter. For example, while the law forbidding witchcraft and the law forbidding bestiality may not share common halachot, the prohibitions themselves are clearly related and it is thus logical why they are taught in one parashah.

However, it is somewhat difficult to understand the connection between the mitzvah of not offering sacrifices to g-ds other than Hashem to the mitzvos that follow of not causing distress to a convert, to a widow or to an orphan. The relationship between the latter three is fairly obvious; each of them has no one to protect their interests and as such, G-d takes special interest in their welfare. Idolatry, however, seems to be totally unrelated to this subject and could have been more logically brought in connection to the mitzvoth of Elokim lo s’kallel venasi b’amcha lo sa’or - You shall not demean Hashem and a prince among your nation you shall not curse (ibid. 22:27).

Ibn Ezra explains that the prohibition of serving idolatry is addressed here to the converts mentioned in the next verse; i.e., you are welcome to join the nation provided that you renounce your ties to other gods. Chizkuni supports this by noting that both witchcraft and bestiality, mentioned beforehand, are attributes of the nations of Canaan , the people most likely to want to convert so as to avoid banishment from their lands or death if they fought.

Ramban strongly rejects this and writes that the reference here is to the Celestial angels who are referred to as Elokim (see Tehillim 86:8) or Eilim (see Shemos 15:11). In his view it is easy to mistake G-d’s powers [the angels] for G-d Himself and make them the object of our worship. We do so because we want to create a G-d with whom we are comfortable, making Him in the image that fits our needs. We prefer a G-d whose vision is limited to the areas where we are not afraid to have our actions exposed. If He is also watching over the converts, widows and orphans, it means that He is Omnipresent and not subject to our whims. This is the essence of the structure of Jewish living and is thus very much at home in this parashah.

ALTARATIONS
Parashas Yisro


Mizbach adamah ta’asu li … v’im mizbach avanim ta’aseh li, lo sivneh eshen gazis … velo sa’aleh v’ma’alos al mizbechi … You shall make an altar of earth for me … and if you make an altar of stone, do not build it out of cut stone … and you shall not ascend my altar using steps … (Shemos 21-23)

Many years ago, I was walking home from shul on Friday night with my then six or seven year old oldest son. He looked up at me and asked the following question: Why does the Torah prohibit ascending the ramp to the altar by using steps whereas we find no similar prohibition in regard to the menorah which was lit by a kohen who ascended three steps. If there is a prohibition of ascending steps during the Divine service because the action causes the robes of the kohen to open and reveal his private parts, should this prohibition not extend to other parts of the service as well?

I had no answer for him and the next morning, when we went to the yeshiva to daven, I proposed that we ask the rosh yeshiva for his opinion. After tefillah we did so and the rosh yeshiva had no ready reply. My son was absolutely amazed that he had managed to stump the rosh yeshiva and that feeling of accomplishment stood him well for quite a few years afterwards. Through the years he has received a couple of answers, none of them completely satisfying. With your indulgence, I’d like to take another stab at it.

Before doing so, however, I would like to pose another series of questions; hopefully, the answers to the latter will help shine light on the former. In this last part of Yisro, the Torah refers to a number of seemingly unrelated restrictions: 1] the requirement to construct the mizbeach from earth rather than stone, 2] when using stone [a requirement in the Tabernacle and Battei Mikdash (see Devarim 27:6)] the requirement to insure that it was not quarried in the usual manner by cutting it with a metal saw. The Torah specifies that this was forbidden since metal is associated with weaponry and is thus unsuitable for use in the area. If so, why is there no similar prohibition regarding the shulchan which was made of wood and theoretically also required cutting? 3] The Torah then specifies that the kohen was not to ascend the altar using steps, for in doing so his robes would open and he would be deficient in his modesty. This would seem to have nothing to do with the previous command? 4] What do these restrictions share other than applying to the mizbeach?

Obviously, the entire Divine service is deeply symbolic. I would suggest that the mizbeach hachitzon [the altar in the Temple/Tabernacle court used for the sacrifices as opposed to the mizbach ha-zahav – the altar inside the kodesh usd for the incense] has a far different symbolic meaning than do the other utensils. The shulchan, mizbeach hazahav and menorah symbolize G-d’s relationship to mankind. The menorah symbolizes Torah and the Divine knowledge and wisdom that has been imparted to mankind. The shulchan represents the bounty of Divine sustenance given to man whereas the mizbeach hazahav – the altar of gold used for the offering of the incense – represents Divine forgiveness for the incense was source for kapparah. All three keilim are symbolic of G-d’s relationship to man - a relationship that changes and is based on each man's standing and understanding. As such, the relationship is far less subject to misinterpretation or perversion.

The exterior mizbeach, on the other hand, represents or symbolizes man’s relationship to G-d, his efforts to bond himself to Hashem through his actions [korbanot]. This bond to Hashem is contingent on a number of factors: it must be precisely as outlined by G-d, for otherwise we have created a god whose parameters, commands and will have been determined by man rather than by G-d. Furthermore, the normal relationship between G-d and man [if one can make reference to a normal relationship] allows for a set of logical circumstances wherein the rules are set aside by other contingencies. For example, halachah allows for the concept of pikuach nefesh wherein the requirements for mitzvah observance are set aside because of an emergency situation. The Talmud seems to imply that the basis for this is logical [chalel alav Shabbos achas k'dei sheyishmor Shabbasos harbeh - violate one Shabbos on his behalf so that he might observe many other Shabbasos]. The exception to this are the three cardinal sins: idolatry, murder and forbidden relations. These are not included because it would seem that it is self-understood that our relationship with G-d is predicated on society being free of these anti-Divine aspects.

The three mitvot outlined at the end of this parashah correspond to these three sins: mizbeach avanim corresponding to idolatry, refraining from using a cutting implement corresponding to killing and no steps corresponding to modesty and forbidden relationships. They only applied to the mizbeach, for it was the altar upon which the korbanot were offered that symbolized man’s desire to draw close to his creator. It is specifically as regards the altar that G-d allows no alterations, for the altar, more than all of the other utensils in the Tabernacle symbolizes the way we view G-d.

May it be His will that we always serve Him in the way that He chose.

THE FEAR FACTOR I
Parashas B’shalach

ha-mibli ein kevarim b’eretz Mitzrayim l’kachtanu lamus bamidbar ... halo zeh hadavar asheer dibarnu eilecha b’Mitzrayim laimor, chadal mimenu v’na’avdah es mitzrayim (Shemos 14:11-12) - are there not enough graves in the land of Egypt that you took us to die in the desert ... this is what we said to you in Egypt when we said: Leave them alone and we will be servants to Egypt!

Rav S. R. Hirsch writes that these pesukim reveal that am Yisrael does not lose its sense of humor or cynicism even in the darkest moments in history. Rashi wonders where the source is that Jews had actually said to Moshe, chadal mimenu v’na’avdah es mitzrayim - leave them alone and we shall be servants to Egypt. He points out that this statement is the implication of the comment made when Moshe and Aharon left Pharaoh’s palace in dejection, having tried to win freedom for the Jews but having worsened their working conditions instead. The pasuk (Shemos 5:21) states: Vayomru ailehem: yeireh hashem aleichem veyishpot asher hivashtem es reichenu b’ainai Pharaoh uv’ainai avadov loses cherev b’yadam l’hargenu - And they [Israel] said to them [Moshe and Aharon]: Hashem shall reveal Himself to you and He will judge, for you have ruined the scent of us in the eyes of Pharaoh and in the eyes of his servants by providing a sword in their hands with which to kill us.

Two questions seem to immediately present themselves; one grammatical, the other logical. Our pasuk, for some reason, changes person in midstream - chadal mimenu - literally, leave him alone in third person singular which then changes to v’na’avdah - and we shall serve in third person plural.

Furthermore, the source that Rashi offers, for you have ruined the scent of us in the eyes of Pharaoh and in the eyes of his servants by providing a sword in their hands with which to kill us, seems to be telling us something entirely different than the quote from our pasuk, leave them alone and we will be servants to Egypt. The former phrase seems to suggest that the Jews were accusing Moshe and Aharon of being failures; you promised that we would be redeemed and all you accomplished was worsening our conditions of servitude. Indeed, Moshe then voiced this very complaint to Hashem. In the latter citation, however, the complaint seems to be that G-d was going to allow them to be killed in the desert and that there was therefore no point in having been redeemed from Egypt. And indeed, Moshe later raises this point when he pleads with G-d not to destroy them at the incident of the golden calf. There he says (32:12): lamah yomru Mitzrayim leimor, b’ra’ah hotziam laharog osom beharim - why should Mitzrayim state that He took them out with evil intent so as to kill them in the hills - a parallel to what the Jews were claiming here.

Perhaps, in our resolution of the first question, we can find a means of dealing with the second. I would like to suggest that the reference in the first phrase -
chadal mimenu - leave him alone - is to Israel as a nation or group whereas the phrase v’na’avdah - and we shall serve - uses the third person plural because it is referring to Jews as a collective of individuals. Whoever was speaking in this pasuk noted that the Jews as a singular nation did not yet exist, they had not yet shed their past identities and taken on their national character which would mold them into a single people who could be referred to in singular. The second phrase therefore refers to them in third person plural, indicating they still needed time in the forge of Egypt, for it was there that the refinement process would take place.

This was the essence also of what the Jews told Moshe when he failed to convince Pharaoh to release them from Egypt. They believed that G-d would one day remove them, the message and promise to their forebears was still clear to them. However, they were not sure that they were ready to begin their mission as a people, and when Pharaoh hardened their work load, that only served to convince them that G-d agreed.

This fear of not being worthy, of lacking the requisite ability or merit, seems to repeat itself throughout Chumash. We find that upon hearing the Divine voice reveal the Torah at Sinai, the people plead with Moshe to serve as the conveyor of the Divine message, for they are concerned that their intrinsic shortcomings may lead them to die. Similarly, we shall iy”h see that this fear factor rears its head at the time of the manna and slav, the m’raglim and the other incidents of rebellion in the desert.

The Kotzker rebbe zt”l is reported to have once said: It is one thing to remove the Jews from Egypt. It is a greater miracle to remove Egypt from the Jews. Part of the legacy of our years of servitude in Egypt is the sense of our being unable to fulfill what G-d expects of us, a fear that can often cause us to become depressed or paralyzed. Little do we realize that by very definition G-d would not expect us to accomplish something that we were physically - or spiritually - incapable of. It’s a message we would do well to consider and share with our children.

ACTIONS SPEAK LOUDER THAN WORDS
Parashas Bo

V’haya lachem l’mishmeres ad arba’ah asar yom ... And it shall be for safekeeping until the fourteenth day (Shemos 12:6).

Rashi poses a question: Why was it necessary to select the animal used for the first korban Pesach on the 10th of Nisan and watch it until the fourteenth, a requirement that was never repeated? He answers by citing a Mechilta. R. Masya ben Cheresh said: Scripture (Yechezkel 16:8) teaches, And I [G-d] passed over you and I saw you and behold, the time was a time of love - i.e., the time had come to fulfill the vow that I made to Avraham that I would redeem his sons. But they did not have mitzvos in which they were absorbed which would have brought them redemption, as the verse (ibid.) states: and you [Israel] were naked and bare. He [G-d] therefore provided them with two mitzvos - the blood of the Pesach and the blood of circumcision.

Rashi noted that there is a clear difference between the offering of the original korban Pesach and those offered subsequently, a discrepancy that has obvious significance. If we interpret the word l’mishmeres at the beginning of the pasuk as indicating that one had to select the animal a number of days beforehand so as to be sure that the animal was free of any blemishes that would disqualify its use as a korban, why was there no such command in later years when a blemish would also disqualify the animal? That clarified, we might also ask how does the citation from the Mechilta answer the question?

The Mechilta also seems to be somewhat unclear. The first part of the verse suggests that Hakadosh Baruch Hu figuratively looked at His calendar and saw that the time to fulfill His promise to Avraham had arrived. If this was the reason for the redemption, what difference would it make if the nation was naked and bare? Secondly, how do the mitzvos of circumcision and korban Pesach serve to rectify this deficiency anymore than any other mitzvah. If Am Yisrael required something to prove their readiness for redemption, why these two mitzvos? One might suggest that these two were chosen, for they have special import in that they are the only mitzvos aseh for which the punishment for failure to fulfill them is kares. This is somewhat disingenuous, however, for G-d could have chosen to make any of the 246 other mitzvos aseh punishable by kares!

These questions belie a more common one often posed by our children and students. If G-d knows what is going on in my head, if He is truly a yodeia machshavos, why do I need to enunciate my tefillos or even do mitzvos? Interestingly, Rashi [12:13, c.v. v’ra’isi es ha-dam] writes in regard to the commandment that they paint their door posts with blood: Everything is revealed to Him. However G-d says, I use My eyes to see that you are absorbed in My mitzvos and then I pass over you. Clearly, as far as G-d is concerned, actions speak louder than words or thoughts.

One might recognize G-d’s power and even acknowledge His dominion. However, if man is not “absorbed” in the performance of His mitzvos, they are but a fleeting thought that does not bear witness to his essence. The redemption from Egypt was not only time bound in the sense of being dependent upon reaching the appropriate time in history for Israel to begin its Divine mission. It was also bound by the people having reached a level of commitment that takes a demonstration of absorption in mitzvos to prove. Perhaps the mishmeres called for before the offering of the original korban Pesach was not simply to determine whether or not there was a blemish in the animal chosen. It was also a period of time called for to determine that there was no blemish in Am Yisrael - that she was absorbed in mitzvos and thus truly ready for redemption.

Two mitzvos - korban Pesach and circumcision - bear witness to Am Yisrael’s perfection, for they are the two acts that symbolize the special covenant between G-d and man; circumcision on the personal level and Pesach on the national level. It is thus fitting that they are the only mitzvos aseh for which the punishment is kares, for failure to fulfill them is a declaration that I have no connection - either privately or publicly - with the Covenant with G-d. And that Covenant has to be backed by actions, for words by nature cannot create an eternal bond. Just as the bond between man and woman is not accomplished by verbalization but rather, through actual kinyan, so too does the relationship between G-d and man demand action and absorption in His mitzvos.

LESSONS IN DISCIPLINE I
Parashas Va’era

One of the questions dealt with by most of the commentaries pertains to the meaning of hachbadas ha-lev - the hardening of Pharaoh’s heart. To what extent did Pharaoh lose his bechirah chofshis - free will? If he was compelled to act as he did, how could he be punished for refusing to agree to Moshe’s request? Furthermore, what purpose was there in continuing to meet with him and present this request if it was clear and pre-ordained that he would refuse them? Granted that Pharaoh and the Egyptians deserved a special measure of punishment for having overdone the role in serving as the forge through which am Yisrael needed to pass and be purified before beginning their manifest destiny. Understood that the ruler and his people were to serve as the stage for the performance of a set of miracles that would forever impress humanity with G-d’s power and His intervention in history. Nonetheless, why were Moshe and Aharon called to keep on entering into a dialogue that led nowhere? Could they have not just showed up at the royal palace and held a press conference announcing the plague that was about to occur?

Rav Hirsch [especially developed in his commentary to the Pesach haggadah, Nachalat ha-Sar], sees each makah - plague - as one in a series of sets of three designed to uproot Pharaoh’s [and by extension humanity’s] overblown self-confidence and self-reliance. This is alluded to by the inscription on Moshe’s staff of detzach adash b’achav - the acronyms for the plagues. While this may help us understand the necessity of each one of the set which teaches us a different lesson, why the repetition?

Rambam [Hilchos Teshuvah 6:3] seems to suggest that the episode with Pharaoh was meant to teach humanity a critical lesson; man can reach a point through his sins where teshuvah is no longer a possibility. Pharaoh was the vehicle used to deliver this message and thus Hashem hardened his heart and removed his free will to preclude his agreeing to Moshe’s request. Many of the late rishonim seem to object to this view.

Abarbanel writes that it is impossible to conceive that man could reach a point from which there is no return. The essence of the Divine relationship with man is lo echpotz b’mos ha-mes ki im b’shuvo medarko vechayah - I [Hashem] do not desire that the dead [i.e., the sinner] shall die, rather that he return from his path [i.e., teshuvah] and thereby live. However, teshuvah does not necessarily preclude punishment. If a person steals, he must still compensate his victim and not simply rely upon the fact that he has changed his path. By hardening his heart, Abarbanel concludes, Hashem enabled Pharaoh and his people to suffer the punishments that they needed to achieve atonement.

Perhaps there is a somewhat different approach based on an idea that I saw in the Sefer ha-Ikkarim of R. Yosef Albo. When a person does teshuvah after suffering or being punished, there are two reasons why he might have repented; he may seek a means of relieving himself from that suffering and seek to avoid its continuance through teshuvah or he may have seen the correlation between the sin and his suffering and concluded that he needs to repent. Both paths of teshuvah seem to be motivated by his desire to end the suffering, but the former lacks the intellectual acceptance that is at the heart of the latter and that is ultimately an integral part of true teshuvah.

G-d punishes man through midah k’neged midah to demonstrate to man that what happens to him is directly connected to what he does. Moreover, Divine punishment [see what is said to Kayin and to Noach] is portrayed as being ba’avur ha-adam - on behalf of man, rather than being b’glal ha-adam - because of man; i.e., it is meant to bring man to an elevated level of Divine consciousness and is not a reaction to what man has done.

When Moshe and Aharon were first told to go to Pharaoh, they were warned that he would not agree to their request. However, they knew that it was not unlikely that as each makah struck Egypt, he would change his mind about listening to them, not because he accepted G-d’s demand that he do so, but out of fear of what was about to transpire. How oblivious can anyone be to what even the royal magicians saw as being G-d's hand. But G-d hardened Pharoah's, allowing Pharaoh to overcome his fear so that his natural disinclination to allow the Jews to leave Egypt would persist for as long as possible. Moshe and Aharon are commanded to continue their dialogue with Pharaoh to demonstrate that is being given the chance to repent but stubbornly refuses to do so. And Pharaoh is punished because he should have overcome his natural stubborness, for he still maintained his free will.

Ultimately, when we discipline our students or children, we are confronted with the a dilemma. Are they truly remorseful or are they simply trying to avoid further punishment? It takes a great deal of s’yatta dishmaya to be certain, a great deal of wisdom to be able to discern if they got the message. We can only be comforted by the fact that their hearts are hopefully not being hardened by external factors.